Reader Tale Offers Many Important Lessons

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Published on Wednesday, June 03, 2009 12:00:00 PM

Few poker players have the judgment and confidence to make a big laydown (folding a very strong hand when presented with evidence that you’re up against an even stronger hand).

Most of the time, players will call with their big hand even when they “know” they are beaten, in part because they can’t stand the thought of throwing away a big hand, and in part because they want everyone to see how unlucky they’ve been, both bad (if understandable) reasons.

I recently received an email from Dustin in Nebraska, thanking me for his $50 check for winning the WNP issue #9 poker humor contest, and including a story about a hand he’d recently played. After I wrote back to make sure he was OK with my revealing his name (I told him I was planning on praising some of his actions and criticizing others, and that I’d be happy just to use his letter as a base and say it was from “a reader”) he agreed to let me use both the story and his name in this article. Here’s what he wrote:

Dustin’s Story

“I want to add something, because I was proud of myself. I was playing 30-60 hold’em at Harvey’s riverboat in Iowa when the following hand came up: I’m on the button with pocket fours. Someone in mid position called, I called, the big blind raised, the mid-position player called, I re-raised and the BB and the other player called.

“The flop was A-4-x. The big blind bet, the other guy folded, and I called. The turn was another four. The BB checked, I bet, and he called. The river was another ace (making the board A-4-x-4-A). He checked. I was just about to hit him with everything I had when I got this real funny feeling.

“I glanced up and (it sounds stupid, I know) saw a bead of sweat on his forehead. I started feeling funny and said to myself, ‘He’s got pocket aces.’ I don’t know why, but I envisioned it. I threw my quad 4’s face up in the muck. He smiled and said, “Kid (I’m only 21), you are the smoothest poker player I’ve ever seen, you’re the best,” dragged the pot, and showed me and everyone else quad aces. He even gave me the t-shirt he won for getting four of a kind (jacks or better)! I thought you’d like that story.”

The Good News and the Bad News

I did like Dustin’s story because it’s a collection of both good and questionable moves (including some questionable moves by the fellow with four aces, but I’ll leave those for another day), and makes for interesting analysis. Let’s look at the decisions Dustin made along the way.

1) Calling one bet pre-flop with 4-4 on the button. I think folding is slightly—but only slightly—better. To call, I’d like another player or two in the hand, to get the right payoff on the unlikely (8-1) chance I flop a set, but calling is fine; there’s a good chance Dustin will be playing four-handed with position. If there hadn’t already been one caller, I’d advocate a raise to narrow the field or win the hand then and there, but with one player already in, even a raise means there’s a good chance you’ll be playing pocket fours three-handed, which is exactly the way you DON’T want to be playing 4-4; you’d rather have six opponents, or one.

2) Re-raising pre-flop when the BB has raised and the limper has called. I don’t like this at all. Even if the BB re-raises, and you can’t know that he will, with two bets already in, there’s a pretty strong chance the limper will call, and if the BB doesn’t re-raise, the limper is a mortal lock to call one more bet. This means Dustin is either putting two (or three) more bets in to play pocket fours three-handed, or putting four bets in to play them heads-up against someone who has shown a lot of strength.

3) Calling on the flop with a set of fours. I can see good arguments for and against this and can’t really judge it without knowing my opponent. If he has A-K or A-Q, you’re probably happy you just called, because he will lead out again on the turn, or perhaps even check-raise, but if he has something like J-J, your call has scared him and he will probably check and fold to a bet. There’s already a lot of money in the pot and there’s nothing wrong with trying to win it right now. My first instinct is to raise, especially if there are any plausible draws out there, and to call if only if I’m up against someone who I think is weak and who will lead out again at me on the turn.

4) Betting the turn with quad fours. I think this is correct by a wide margin. I know a lot of players would check to try to induce a bet on the end, and to give a free card that will give the other guy a chance to catch something good enough to trap him, but for all you know, the other guy is planning on check-raising you, and if he can’t at least call a bet now, with all the money that’s already in the pot, the odds are he isn’t going to be able to call one on the end.

5) Throwing quad fours “face up in the muck” on the end. This is a bit confusing. “The muck” implies Dustin killed his own hand without even a bet, and by saying his opponent “dragged the pot, and showed me and everyone else quad aces,” it sounds even more like the opponent already had the pot won and decided to show his hand. If that’s what happened, Dustin’s move would be dead wrong no matter how strong a tell he had on his opponent. It doesn’t cost anything to check along if you’re sure you’re up against aces. You can always muck it or show it later.

On the other hand, “face up” implies that Dustin was just checking and showing that he had read the other guy for four aces. Let’s assume that’s what happened.

Dustin scores a LOT of points in my book for being able to make this read. Most players get so excited when they make four of a kind, the possibility of losing never even enters their minds until they’ve been re-raised for the fifth time, unless perhaps the board shows four open-ended high straight flush cards, or something like A-4-A-4-A, meaning anyone with a single ace has four aces. Staying aware enough to look for a tell, and to discern, perhaps as a result not only of the sweat, but of the betting pattern which certainly made aces a possibility, that he was beaten, is praiseworthy.

The Other Shoe Drops

And now the other shoe drops… because I think that even with a read this good, Dustin is supposed to bet, in a limit hold’em game. Poker and blackjack are very different games, but one point that applies well to both is that just because a hunch works, that doesn’t mean that it’s necessarily a positive-expectation play for the long run.

In a no-limit or pot-limit game, where a bet could mean exposing yourself to a re-raise that you don’t want to call because of your read, I think a check is more forgivable. Ditto for the same situation very late in a limit tournament, when the bets are large, and where, because of the sudden death nature of tournaments, you can’t just reach into your pocket for more chips after a horrible beat. But I think even late in a limit tournament, Dustin probably needs more than spotting a bead of sweat to check.

I hesitated before writing those two previous paragraphs, because in general, poker players get themselves in trouble by not going with their judgment, and it was tempting to credit Dustin for going with his judgment on his read. Many times players make a good read, but cannot lay down a big hand, because they get big hands so rarely. They lack confidence in their judgment.

Here “going with one’s judgment” was a bit easier, as Dustin could go with it without needing to lay a hand down. His decision to check costs him nothing if his opponent folds, one bet if his opponent calls and loses, and two bets if his read is right and his opponent raises. A decision that costs at most two bets isn’t as significant as one that can cost you the whole pot.

A Hypothetical Change in the Betting Action

Let’s pause for a moment to allow me to propose a hypothetical change in the action to discuss another important concept. I’m going to evaluate play as if Mr. Four Aces had bet and Dustin made the correct read and decided to fold.

I’d have been quite impressed with the RESULT, but I would DEFINITELY put that move in the “don’t try this at home, folks” category. You have to be awfully sure of yourself to fold quads, and I wouldn’t encourage anyone to try it without the read of a lifetime on your opponent. That bead of sweat also could have been coming from ownership of top full house.

If Dustin had explained his check in terms of suspecting aces all along from the betting action, and had ruled out top full house the same way, I’d have been more inclined to say “great read and great judgment in going with your read.” But he expressed it as a feeling that he himself called “stupid,” and while I think that’s too harsh, I think players often conveniently forget about the times they go with odd feelings and those feelings turn out to be wrong.

This is especially true of times when players do things like calling two bets pre-flop with junk hands like 10-8 suited because they “have a feeling,” hit a ten or an eight on the flop, and wind up losing a bunch of money. Dustin’s “feeling” belongs in a different category, coming on the end with some actual information to base the feeling upon, but you see how getting yourself in the habit of going with odd feelings can be dangerous.

In sum, if your “intuition” springs from your conscious analysis of how the betting action went down on a hand, combined with any feelings or tells you pick up, it’s important to have the courage to follow your intuition.

If your intuition is just a feeling you can’t explain, and you’re not a world class player who has a track record of being able to read and feel things most players can’t, I would recommend making the conventional play until a point in your playing career when you’ve accumulated proof that your intuition is usually right in such situations.

Insufficient Evidence

Here, the only evidence Dustin cites is the bead of sweat. In limit poker, I don’t think that’s enough. Dustin is young, and may well turn out to be one of those world class players who does more with feel than most players can do with logic, but it’s too early to say that and I think dangerous for other players to play that way until they’ve proven to themselves that their reads really are that good.

As to showing the hand, my final analysis changes from the real action (where Dustin was just checking along), or if he had decided to fold in the face of a bet (as I proposed in my hypothetical), but in either case, I think showing his hand is a mistake, albeit a tempting one. (Note that if you are playing in a jackpot game, you absolutely MUST show your hand to collect your half of the jackpot!)

Tells Are Valuable: Don’t Waste Them

If Dustin was just checking along, in most poker rooms, the BB would have to show his hand first, and Dustin could/should muck. Why? Because he seems to have the tell of a lifetime on his opponent, and if you pick up a tell that good, normally you don’t want the other guy to know it.

If money isn’t your primary motivating factor for playing, then I certainly understand showing the hand, as it gathers a lot of laurels and respect from the other players. That’s worth something emotionally, no question. I’m just not sure if it would be worth the money it figures to cost Dustin, although he mentioned in his email that he’s already known as the biggest rock in the state, so people probably bluff at him (carefully!) already anyway.

If Mr. Aces had bet, folding and showing the laydown would be a mistake of colossal proportions. Even though Dustin would have made the correct decision (remember, this is a hypothetical, Dustin didn’t make this mistake), by showing he’s willing to fold a hand as strong as quad fours, he’s inviting people to play more aggressively against him, and most poker players don’t play aggressively enough, so his action makes his opponents play better.

Making a Laydown vs. Showing a Laydown

Making a big laydown is one thing, and only a great player can do it, unless the opponent is an amateur whose actions are so obvious he might as well be playing with his cards face up. Showing a big laydown is quite another thing, and I believe only a great player should dare it, because only a great player can correctly anticipate all the fallout from showing such a startling move.

Most great players don’t show when they make a big laydown, because they are more interested in money than laurels. They don’t want people acting more aggressively against them, and they don’t want to reveal tells they’ve picked up, although I could imagine circumstances where a great player shows the laydown in a deliberate attempt to rattle an opponent. Movie fans will remember that Matt Damon did this to Teddy KGB (John Malkovich) in Rounders.

All that said, it’s human nature to want the respect and praise of our fellow players, so I can understand the temptation to show a brilliant move. Nonetheless, if you’re going to voluntarily show cards the rules don’t require you to show, you need to ask yourself why you’re doing it, and what the long term impact is likely to be.

This article was written by Andrew N.S. Glazer, the Poker Pundit.

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