Predictable Players Are Losing Players

Published on Wednesday, May 14, 2008 10:30:00 AM

David Sklansky, in his wonderful book The Theory of Poker, discusses the "penny wise and pound foolish" error at length. A mistake that costs you one bet is a small error; worth avoiding, certainly, but only a small error. A mistake that costs you an entire pot is a disaster. In the kind of pots that most low-stake poker players play, a pot is often 10 to 20 times the size of one big bet.

A variation on this theme came up for me in a game one time, and the hand tells a few important tales. A lot of players, particularly aggressive players, don't like to show their hands when they're caught bluffing. If they bluff on the end, and someone calls them, they often toss their hand into the muck, figuring (correctly) that while you can bet or raise with anything, calling on the end requires a reasonable hand, because you're going to have to show the hand down.

So these players, knowing that they are going to lose, don't want their opponents to know just how bad a hand they were playing, and throw their hands away without even seeing what cards their caller held.

Don't Be So Fast to Muck

Most of the time, this is a reasonable approach (although it would be even more reasonable to bluff less). But ANYTHING done to predictable excess in poker is very dangerous, including the habit of mucking your hand when you're called on the end.

One time I was playing 6-12 Texas Hold'em, and had been dealt 2-3 offsuit in the big blind. I would almost never play this sort of hand if I had to call any money with it, not even from the small blind for half a bet, but no one raised before the flop, so I got to see the flop for free.

The flop came 4-5-10 rainbow (all different suits), and suddenly I was very interested, because I had an open-ended straight draw, and everyone knew this was the sort of flop that could easily miss everyone. So if anyone bet, there would likely be lots of callers—exactly the kind of multi-way action someone with a straight draw wants.

I particularly loved this flop with this hand because if an Ace hit the board, it would make me the nuts, while almost certainly improving one or more of the other players who had been loitering around with an Ace—improving him just enough to lose lots of money.

Three Free Cards, Why Not Another?

I checked—I'd already received three useful free cards, maybe I could get another—but another player bet, and three others called by the time it got back to me. I called also – a trivially easy call, with an open-ended straight draw, a large pot, and wonderful implied odds on how much I could get paid off if I made the hand – making it a party of five.

The turn card was a nine, another card that could easily have helped no one, but it was also the sort of random card that could help someone who'd come in via the big blind, so I decided to test the waters and bet.

Sure enough, the cards on board hadn't helped many players; everyone folded except one player, who called. I knew this player pretty well, well enough to know that he frequently bluffed at pots on the end, and quite frequently tossed his cards into the muck if his bluff was called… and the stirrings of a wacky idea started coming to me. The pot now contained $93. The river card was a King.

I now held the absolutely worst possible hand. My 2-3 offsuit was lower than everything on the board, so my hand WAS the board. My hand was worthless in a showdown; my only chance was to outplay my opponent.

To Bluff Or Not To Bluff, That Is The Question

Usually, holding a hand that can't win in a showdown means trying a bluff, but I didn't think that was my best course. For one thing, my opponent could easily have been holding a king, and I'd just have to throw my hand away if he raised. Worse yet, even if he didn't have a king, bluffers frequently suspect others of bluffing, so I figured he would call a bet with any sort of hand. Besides, there was that insidious, wacky idea still tugging at my shirttails.

I decided I would use my opponent's predictability against him. I would let him bluff, and then call him, and see if his hand would hit the muck. If he checked behind me, of course, my plan couldn't work, but I felt pretty sure that a check would induce the bluff.

Naturally, I wouldn't be writing about this if the result hadn't been spectacular. I checked, he bet, I called, and he threw his hand away. I took the pot without ever showing my hand. I'd won a $117 pot with the absolute worst possible hand, because my opponent was too predictable.

I certainly wouldn't recommend "trying this trick at home."  It worked only because my opponent was far too consistent. I might go the rest of my poker life without trying it again. What lessons should you take away, then? First and foremost, predictability is bad for your poker health, extreme predictability worse still. Finally, if calling for one bet on the end is usually right, being willing to turn your cards over and giving them their bought and paid for chance to win can't be too wrong, either.

This article was written by Andrew N.S. Glazer, the Poker Pundit.